Victims of Peace: Current Abuse Allegations against U.N. Peacekeepers and the
Role of Law in Preventing them in the Future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peacekeepers, and peacekeeping, have had a special place in society since the
time of the Bible,1 and indeed have taken on a new, international dimension since the end
of World War II and the creation of the United Nations.2 Unfortunately, since the creation
of the United Nations peacekeepers (U.N. peacekeepers) as a reality of international
conflict intervention,3 a disparity in how one defines peacekeepers has been created. For
laymen, Webster’s Dictionary defines “peacekeeping” as “the preserving of peace.”4 For
lawyers, Black’s Law Dictionary does not define the term outright, but defines the
concept of “peace” at law as “[a] state of tranquility; freedom from civil disturbance or
hostility.”5 However, for an increasingly visible number of people living in the areas to
which U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed, peacekeepers are defined in other terms:
rapists,6 patrons of prostitutes,7 child pornographers,8 molesters,9 absentee fathers,10
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tormentors,11 spreaders of contagion and disease,12 to name some of the most egregious.
Indeed, the U.N. itself defines the multi-national contingent which it deploys as
peacekeepers13 to trouble spots across the globe not only as humanitarians, but also as
“boys,”14 using the idea of “[b]oys will be boys”15 to justify supplying the peacekeepers
with pouches of condoms along with their uniforms and official status.16
On a basic humanitarian level, the above should shock readers of any nationality
and profession. To lawyers, however, especially those concerned with international law,
the above should serve as a wake-up call to the need to change the legal parameters of
multi-national peacekeeping. American lawyers should be particularly concerned with
U.N. peacekeeper abuses because of the role of the U.S. in creating the U.N.,17 and the
close ties between the largely U.S. written U.N. Charter18 and the current, inferential
concept of the acceptability of peacekeeping which has grown out of it.19
The goal of this paper is not merely to critique the U.N. and its handling of the
current peacekeeper abuse allegations, as such a critique would only serve half of the
11
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problem. Rather, this paper will use the past and current understandings of the U.N.
Charter,20 peacekeeping,21 international law,22 and military justice23 to suggest several
options for handling both the current allegations facing U.N. peacekeepers, especially
those in the Congo, and for a fundamental change in the peacekeeping mission,
apparatus, and law in the future.
Part II of this paper will examine the origins of the concept of peacekeeping. It
will go beyond the current and past concepts of U.N. peacekeeping to explore the plain
language of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,24 and the way in which it was originally
interpreted – namely to substantiate a standing U.N. military force and centralized
command with no mention of peacekeeping activities per se.25
Part III will discuss the current allegations against U.N. peacekeepers in the
Congo and elsewhere,26 as well as the vague allusions to decades of peacekeeper abuse
found in sources from across the world and the political spectrum.27 Also included in this
Part is the U.N. reaction to the allegations28 and the above mentioned condom
distribution system in effect for U.N. peacekeepers.29 Finally, this Part will discuss the
spread of HIV through U.N. peacekeepers30 and the lax testing requirements in place for
peacekeepers both before and during their active duty.31
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Part IV will discuss the current laws in effect regarding peacekeepers.32 Perhaps
the simplest part of the inquiry, this discussion will illustrate that U.N. peacekeepers are
essentially shrouded in protection from their home countries.33 The iniquity of this
system will be examined, looking at the inequality of military justice available against
peacekeepers based on their country of origin.34 Part IV will then look at the current
International Criminal Court (ICC) statute35 and discuss why the extension of the ICC
crimes and procedures to peacekeepers would not be an effective way to ensure either
prosecution of peacekeepers for individual abuses or eligibility for prosecution at all.36
To set the framework for the discussion in Part VI, this Part will also include a basic
outline of the sanction power possessed by the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC).37
In contrast to the legal morass presented in Part IV, Part V will describe the
current status of the United States Code of Military Justice (USCMJ)38 and what
prosecutions of peacekeepers would be allowed under it.39 A comparison of the
procedural aspects of a prosecution under the USCMJ and the ICC statute provisions will
be made as well.40
The culmination of this paper is Part VI, in which the author presents several
possible options for addressing the current U.N. peacekeeper abuse allegations and for
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changing peacekeeping in the future.41 It is the author’s belief that, in light of past
attitudes of U.N. officials towards peacekeeper abuse allegations42 and the current spate
of corruption allegations plaguing the U.N. and its administration,43 the U.N. is an
inappropriate organization to handle the peacekeeper abuses. To deal with the immediate
allegations, the author recommends that the UNSC direct (and send trusted
representatives to oversee) the creation of secure peacekeeper compounds, as well as
promulgate rules creating new positions of overseers of peacekeepers who are
representatives from at least two of the five permanent UNSC members based on their
relative contribution. The author’s reasoning for this suggestion, outside of the basic
sense of responsibility for the U.N. forces which is imparted to the permanent members
of the UNSC under the U.N. Charter,44 is her very strong belief that U.S. taxpayers, who
are protected by concrete laws regarding such crimes as rape and molestation, would not
want their money to go towards the further subsidization of peacekeepers who can prey
on victims without a guaranteed recourse.45 In addition, the author highly advocates the
use of economic sanctions against any countries which have contributed peacekeepers
implicated in the abuse and have failed to prosecute, or failed to vigorously prosecute,
those implicated peacekeepers.46 These sanctions should be followed up by removal of
the home countries’ currently stationed peacekeepers, and blacklisting of these countries
for future peacekeeping missions, if vigorous criminal prosecution of the errant
peacekeepers is not made by the home countries.47
41
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To address the future of peacekeeping, the author then proposes a reading of the
Chapter VI provisions of the Charter closer to the original interpretation that these
provisions evince the intent to create a military apparatus attached to the UNSC and
under its ultimate control and authority.48 This reading would allow for the creation of a
separate, standing military and peacekeeping force which would be under the joint
command of at least two of the five permanent UNSC members. While this in and of
itself is not a new idea, the author then proposes that the recruitment and staffing of this
force would not come from voluntary participation by U.N. member countries, but rather
from international recruitment similar to that used by the American military. In this way,
the peacekeepers would be under the control and law of the force itself and not their
home countries. Given the many problems with the ICC statute as applied to at least the
current peacekeeper abuses, the author would further propose that the most compatible
military laws of the five permanent members (in all likelihood the U.S. and the U.K.) be
used and applied to the peacekeepers in this force.
The conclusion of this paper, Part VII, restates the problems and suggestions
discussed and offered throughout the paper. It also expresses the author’s belief that
peacekeeping as a concept offers many benefits, but that these benefits are outweighed by
any types of abuses. The problem of the U.N. peacekeepers illustrates that international
law is flawed in its attempts to create legal consensus throughout the world, with the
ultimate result being that peacekeepers who prey on those they are assigned to protect are
not subject to the same justice. In this situation, it is imperative that the countries which
founded the U.N., particularly the U.S., provide structure to the peacekeepers. Lawyers
facing conflicts of law issues will ultimately always have to choose one law over the
48
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other; if this works for commercial transactions then it should certainly work for the
protection of people.
II. CHAPTER VI AND PEACEKEPING HISTORY
The primary mandate of the U.N. is set out in Chapters V and VII of the
Charter.49 These provisions make it the stated aim of the UNSC to “maint[ain] . . .
international peace and security,”50 and to take action when there are perceived threats to
international peace and/or security.51 A great deal of scholarly work has focused on when
a threat would rise to the level of endangering either international peace and/or security,
but, in recent years at least, there has not been as much focus on the military provisions
of the Charter set out in Chapter VII.52
These provisions are the backbone of the inference that there should be a U.N.
peacekeeping force established and maintained by the UNSC, however this is only an
inference.53 A literal reading of the plain language of the Charter leads one to believe that
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the goal of the framers of the U.N. Charter (which is to say the framers of the U.N. itself)
was to create a standing military body,54 under joint command,55 to serve at the ready if
necessary to protect that stated mission of the U.N.56 On the heels of World War II, the
victorious powers had seen their share of war and destruction,57 and certainly
peacekeeping and stabilization in the wake of war as well, yet the only literal provisions
in the Charter are for the standing military idea.58 Unfortunately, there are no
interpretative aids for divining the intent of the drafters of the U.N. Charter with regard to
these provisions, however it is not a stretch of the imagination to suggest that the intent
was to create a standing military which would provide a host of services to the U.N. and
the world population as a whole,59 as a standard national military would do. Using this
interpretation, peacekeeping would not need to be elaborated or inferred because it is part
of standard military procedure;60 the corollary to this is that there is no elaboration of a
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separate peacekeeping force, implying that all services were to be under the auspices of a
joint command that was to be associated with the UNSC.61
Regardless of how one interprets the actual language of the Charter provisions,
once the Cold War started it was accepted that the concept of a standing military force
under a joint command would not be feasible.62 In this climate, the Charter provisions
were re-examined, and found to infer the idea of a peacekeeping mandate which would
grow to become the current U.N. peacekeeping force,63 also known colloquially as the
“blue helmets” due to the color of the uniforms used.64
At present, there are 66, 918 deployed peacekeepers from 103 countries stationed
in various political and military hot spots throughout the world.65 When conceptualizing
the makeup of this peacekeeping force many, including the author, initially assume that
there is some form of obligation on the part of U.N. members to provide troops and
personnel to serve as peacekeepers. In truth, however, the provision of troops and
personnel is entirely voluntary on the U.N. member countries,66 which are compensated
by the U.N. for these troops and services.67 A persistent problem for U.N. members
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which provide troops and services is recouping payment for these provisions.68 The
troops provided are military personnel within their home countries and, as will be
discussed further in Part IV, are subject to the jurisdiction of their home countries for
prosecution should the event occur.69
Over the course of their history, U.N. peacekeepers have served in every
conceivable situation, and indeed many have lost their lives in the course of peacekeeping
activities.70 In the spirit of these activities, the U.N. peacekeepers were awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1988,71 and are honored by the U.N. with a yearly ceremonial day
of recognition and commendation.72 Perhaps this is the most disturbing contrast given the
current abuse allegations, as various sources have reported that U.N. peacekeepers have
been implicated in sexual abuse scandals and activities since their inception.73 As with
the composition of the peacekeeper missions themselves, these abuse allegations are a
truly global phenomenon, with new and old allegations coming from Cambodia to the
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Congo to Haiti to name only a few.74 Indeed, in 2004, only months before the first Congo
abuse stories started to surface, there was a public admission by a U.N. official that there
were sexual abuses by peacekeepers assigned to the border area of Ethiopia and Eritrea.75
Thus, the history of the U.N. peacekeepers is one of questionable interpretation
and activities as well as humanitarian awards and missions. What is most bothersome to
this author is that the history of the peacekeepers has such a pronounced dichotomy
between saving people and countries and acting as criminals. No matter how the U.N.
Charter provisions are interpreted, the wording evinces the idea that some kind of
security force was necessary to protect the world from the ravages of war and human
atrocities, and indeed many peacekeepers have given their lives for this goal. However,
those charged with carrying out the administrative charge created by the Charter have
failed to protect both the intent of the Charter’s framers and those who find themselves in
the midst of war and chaos, and have allowed the peacekeepers to become victimizers.
III. ALLEGATIONS, CONTRACEPTIVES, AND HIV/AIDS
The primary abuse allegations addressed in this paper are the sexual abuse
allegations made against the peacekeepers, as these represent the gravest breach of the
duty of peacekeepers and represent an utter disregard for the sanctity of human life,
particularly the lives of young girls. It is important to note, however, that in the days prior
to the writing of this paper there have been increasing questions regarding the use of
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force by peacekeepers,76 and whether force is used outside of the sanctioned self-defense
realm.77 This issue highlights the need for a central military law governing peacekeepers
of all nationalities, as such a system would allow for a more immediate adjudication of
such allegations and would ensure that those peacekeepers involved would be uniformly
investigated, and either exonerated or prosecuted under the same legal principles and
terms.
A. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE PEACEKEEPERS
A young girl, out gathering coal for her family to use as they try to sustain
themselves in the middle of a war, encounters a soldier on her errand.78 In seconds she
goes from coal bringer to rape victim at the hands of the solider, who cavalierly walks
away from his deed.79 Worse yet, it is possible that this girl could face reprisals from her
family if she tells them of the crime. Another young girl, roughly the same age as the
first, prostitutes herself to a man in a uniform.80 She is not a troubled teen, she is not a
runaway, she is merely trying to get an egg so that her family might have something to
eat for dinner.81
A young mother looks at her baby unsure of how to provide for it or how it will
be accepted in her village. The father, a man in a uniform from another country and
another race, has left and she cannot find him.82 Those who worked with him refuse to
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help her or her baby survive, let alone find the father.83 Another mother, just 17 years old,
looks at her child and her husband in horror as she finds out that the soldier who attacked
her gave her HIV/AIDS and she, unknowingly, has passed the disease on to her husband
and newborn child.84
These vignettes might sound as though they are a combination of stories from
various recent wars and tortured movie plots, however in reality they are the stories of
many women who have made allegations of various types of sexual abuse against U.N.
peacekeepers in the Congo. These stories are not uncommon, and indeed typify what the
U.N. describes as the problem with placing troops like peacekeepers in a wartime setting:
social upheaval and instability, coupled with the economic position of the peacekeepers,
creates an environment where peacekeepers can easily prey on those they should be
protecting.85
The allegations of abuse in the Congo are actually more sordid and distasteful
than the above vignettes, and implicate not only the peacekeeping forces but also the
U.N. administration sent to the conflict areas with them.86 An official’s computer files
were screened and found to contain pornographic images of the official with local
children.87 The same official was caught in a sting operation started by local authorities in
which he attempted to engage in sexual activities with a local, very underage girl.88 He
could not be prosecuted by the local authorities, as he was deemed to fall under the
83
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peacekeeper exception, and was not prosecuted by his home country for his crimes
either.89 On the point of age, to date the youngest reported victim of abuse at the hands of
the peacekeeper was seven years old at the time of the alleged abuse.90 Under the terms
of peacekeeper protocol before these allegations came to light, peacekeepers were
forbidden to have relations with anyone who was under 18 years old.91
The Congo allegations were the result of both an internal U.N. investigation92 and
news exposes by U.S. news programs 20/2093 and Fox News.94 The allegations make
concrete the stories of victims through these accounts, both in news and on television,
and it is easier to estimate the types of offenses the peacekeepers are alleged to have
committed. However, there have been numerous allegations of abuse at other missions
over the history of the U.N. peacekeeping operations which are not as detailed and
provide murkier waters for lawyers looking at potential criminal charges.95 Since the
Congo allegations have surfaced, however, there has been more discussion of the past
allegations in the media, and indeed an allegation made by a Haitian woman was picked
up by the media in the days after the initial Congo story broke.96 While the peacekeepers
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in the Haitian allegation were cleared of rape charges,97 they were nonetheless found to
have engaged in prostitution with the woman in question,98 which constituted a breach of
the peacekeeper policies and resulted in the peacekeepers being publicly sent back to
their home countries.99
B. CONFLICTING MESSAGES
As stated above, the U.N. has maintained a prohibition on sexual relations
between peacekeepers and locals under the age of 18,100 and does not condone
peacekeepers engaging in prostitution.101 What the U.N. does condone, and indeed
accommodate, is easy access to condoms for peacekeepers,102 going so far as to provide
them with pre-filled pouches when they are being briefed for their mission
assignments.103 The official reasoning for this program is the health and safety of the
peacekeepers while they are on their assignments, using the logic that these are typically
young men, and that “[b]oys will be boys.”
The pouches are accompanied by the distribution of cards detailing how to protect
oneself from contracting HIV/AIDS;104 these cards are conveniently printed in over 10
languages for easy understanding.105 These cards have a twofold purpose, the education
of peacekeepers and the education of those living in the areas to which the peacekeepers
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are sent.106 Interestingly, despite the attempts to educate the peacekeepers and provide
them with protection, the U.N. does not require potential peacekeepers to be screened for
HIV/AIDS before they are sent on peacekeeping missions.107 While HIV/AIDS prescreening is standard practice in at least the armed forces of the U.S. and U.K.,108 it is not
necessarily the standard practice in the other U.N. member countries willing to volunteer
troops as peacekeepers.109 The lack of pre-deployment screening of peacekeepers by the
U.N. is particularly disturbing when one notes that in recent years many of the
peacekeeping missions have been comprised of troops from countries where HIV/AIDS
infection rates are rising at catastrophic rates,110 and affecting a large portion of the
population.
However well intentioned the peacekeeper pouches might be, they appear to have
limited success rates in stopping either the transmission of HIV/AIDS to the local
populations or the fathering of children with women from the local population.111
Turning to the HIV/AIDS transmission issue, at least one study has charted an alarming
correlation between the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers from countries with high and
steadily increasing HIV/AIDS infection rates and an increase in the rates of locals
infected by HIV/AIDS after the arrival of the peacekeepers.112 The poignant vignette
above of the new mother discovering that she and her entire family are infected because
of an act by a U.N. peacekeeper113 is a dreadful example of this trend, and sadly is not a
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rare story in the Congo.114 Given the availability of both the empirical evidence and
human tragedies, the U.N. policy of voluntary HIV/AIDS testing is even more disturbing
and calls the peacekeeping administration into further question.115
Turning to the local pregnancy issue, there are media accounts and internal
investigation data to support the conclusion that instances of U.N. peacekeepers fathering
children with local women, or girls, and then leaving without assuming any parental role
or financial responsibility are far from rare.116 Not only do these peacekeepers fail to take
any responsibility or make any financial accommodations for their children, the U.N.
fails to do either of these as well.117
To conclude this Part, the abuse allegations have done more than undermine the
U.N. administration and the credibility of the peacekeeping mission. These abuses,
alleged though they are at present, if true, have taken childhood from countless young
girls- and in some instances boys- and replaced it with physical and psychological pain
and torment. Many of these young victims face social ostracism both now and in the
future as a result of what happened to them.118 The women who have peacekeeperfathered children find themselves in much the same predicament, and are forced to
struggle even more for survival after the arrival of the peacekeepers than before the
peacekeepers arrived in the area.119 And those who contracted HIV/AIDS from the
peacekeepers face myriad consequences and problems as a result of their infection. Some,
like the young woman in the vignette, are faced with the knowledge that they and their
114

Id.
See Avni, supra note 112.
116
See FOX NEWS REPORT, supra note 12.
117
Id.
118
‘Exploitation of women by UN peacekeepers in Congo widespread,” THE PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (Jan. 8,
2005).
119
See id.
115

17

families are condemned to live with, and likely die from, the disease.120 Others will not
know that they are ill until their health deteriorates, and could potentially pass on the
disease further. Still others will know their status and have to try to be productive
members of their society and hope that they will not be shunned by their families and
community because of the disease and the way it was contracted, while at the same time
struggling to find medical treatment if available. None of these scenarios arise out of a
quest for peace, and all that they do is engender hatred and suffering, undermining the
concept of the U.N. in general, as well as peacekeeping, and also undermining the
likelihood that U.N. peacekeepers will be allowed in the area again should they be
needed. In no way can these abuses be seen as maintaining “international peace and
security,” and indeed in many ways these abuses are the same as the atrocities which
were deemed to pose a threat to peace and security occasioning the deployment of the
peacekeepers in the first place.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEACKEEPING
A. CURRENT LAW AFFECTING PEACEKEEPERS
Just as peacekeeping missions are manned by troops from around the world, so
too is the law pertaining to peacekeepers global in its composition. The global quality of
applicable law is due to the fact that, in such instances as peacekeeper sexual abuses or
other misconduct, peacekeepers are not subject to the laws of an international body, but
rather are to be tried, if at all, in their home countries and under the military law of their
home country.121 The most the U.N. administration can do in such a situation is to strip
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the peacekeeper of his position and send him back to his home country.122 Indeed, the
U.N. itself does not make it a practice to chastise the member countries which send
abusive peacekeepers because of the fear that it will lose a source of volunteer
peacekeepers if it offends the sending nation.123
Once in the home country, the peacekeeper is then subject to the military laws of
his country, which include the use of discretion in the decision of whether to prosecute
the peacekeeper.124 A problem for both the home country in making its decision
regarding prosecution and the U.N. administration in evaluating the extensive nature of
the abuses, is the local language barrier,125 as well as the difficulty of trying a case where
the victim is in a far away and impoverished nation, and not likely to testify before a
court even if she could be brought there due to the potential familial and societal reprisals
and ostracism she could face.126
The problem with the state of the law as it relates to peacekeepers is not limited
solely to the above, however, as there is also a grave and constant possibility of uneven
administration of justice against peacekeepers at the same mission, charged with the same
crimes, who are from different countries which have different military laws or different
propensities for prosecuting peacekeepers.127 An example from the current Congolese
abuse allegations is the difference between the fate of a French peacekeeper implicated in
122
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the abuse who went to trial in France when he was returned,128 and two South African
peacekeepers who are still being held, but who have not been tried.129 In addition,
different national legal systems have different concepts of pre-trial rights and procedure,
due process and fair trials, and jury use, leading to different outcomes for the same
crime.130 The author would argue that, to those who created and ran the Nuremburg trials
as a model of international criminal law, this very fact would be offensive.
Additionally, as soldiers in the national army of their home country prior to their
peacekeeping assignment, there is a very strong likelihood that peacekeepers are familiar
with the crimes and punishments used in their military courts. The author further submits
that this is dangerous in that a peacekeeper from a home country with a nascent military
and military law, or one who knows that sentences for sexual abuses are relatively light,
or one who knows that there is a precedent of not prosecuting errant peacekeepers, will
take comfort in that knowledge and feel less inhibited in his abuses, safe in the
knowledge that he will not face serious charges at home. If nothing else, this undermines
international peace and security in already troubled areas, and presents the very prescient
threat that the local population will be victimized by a peacekeeper with such knowledge.
B. PROBLEMS WITH EXTENDING THE ICC STATUTE TO PEACEKEEPERS
The creation of the current ICC statute has codified many of the serious and yet
esoteric crimes created at Nuremberg, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity.131
By providing lawyers and litigants with actual definitions of these crimes, including
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elements, the ICC statute has both clarified the state of international crimes on a grand
scale and made the ability to prosecute peacekeepers for abuses essentially nonexistent.132 Doubtless there will be calls to subject U.N. peacekeepers to the jurisdiction
of the ICC for abuses and do away with the home country military law rule currently in
place. However, a closer look at the ICC statute reveals that there is a very small
likelihood of successful prosecution of individual peacekeepers under the statute.133
Further, should a loophole be found, or should the statute be amended to allow for
individual prosecutions of peacekeeper abuses, the structure of the ICC procedures134 is
such that the ICC is not the proper place to try the peacekeepers.
As a threshold issue, it is very true that both war crimes and crimes against
humanity under the ICC include sexual crimes and abuses such as rape.135 This is
certainly a laudable and appropriate provision, as sexual crimes and abuses are a sad and
disturbing part of conflicts past and present; the problem is that as much as these
provisions are a prosecutorial resource for such political actors and their underlings who
have devised, ordered, and committed such grave crimes as those set forth in the ICC
statute, these are not generally applicable to the peacekeepers based on the facts available
at the present time. The problem with these provisions is that they require, if not a
specific mens rea, at the very least that the actions be part of a larger plan targeted to the
132
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population in general rather than individuals in it.136 This is more akin to a RICO
conspiracy charge under U.S. law,137 with the caveat that those being prosecuted all need
the same mens rea and knowledge predicate of targeting a certain population for harm
and destruction.138
Under such a provision, in order to be prosecuted peacekeepers would have to be
found to have been part of a concerted and organized effort to rape or otherwise sexually
abuse the local population with the goal of harming the population as a whole.139
However widespread the abuses are, it is highly unlikely that there was a specific U.N.
protocol or plan to perpetrate sexual abuses on the local populations of the mission areas;
it is also improbable that there was a specific plan in place at the mission level by U.N.
staffers and administrators to do the same thing. The ICC statute is written in such a way
that it would appear to turn a blind eye to the abuses because it provides no basis for
prosecution of peacekeepers for war crimes or crimes against humanity unless the abuses
were committed as an overall part of a plan to target the local population for abuse,140 and
it would appear unlikely that any of the U.N administrators, commanders, or staffers
could be prosecuted for the same reasons.141
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Assuming that there is a way to read the ICC statute to allow the prosecution of
U.N. peacekeepers individually for sexual abuses, or that the statute was amended to give
the ICC prosecutorial jurisdiction over these cases, there are still several critical
procedural flaws in the statute. First, not all U.N. member states are signatories of the
ICC statute, and thus there would be an unequal prosecution of peacekeepers, akin to the
current situation, if the ICC were used as a venue only for those peacekeepers whose
home countries were ICC signatories.142 Second, the way that the ICC statute is written
and construed, the primary power of the court in getting a case to trial lies with the
Prosecutor, who has much more power than his prosecutorial counterparts in many other
countries, including U.S. civilian and military courts.143 Such a prosecutorial structure
creates a situation which is ripe for over-discretion by the Prosecutor, and is even more
dangerous when one considers that the Prosecutor can be from any country, including the
home country of the peacekeeper.144 Third, as mentioned in the above section, the ability
to have victims, or eyewitnesses, come forward to testify is hampered by the language,
distance, and social gap.145 A corollary to that is that, unlike some adjudicative bodies
142
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such as the U.S. military courts,146 the ICC statute does not grant the ICC the ability to
subpoena or otherwise compel witnesses to testify before the court.147 While the image of
forcing a young victim in front of a foreign court is not particularly attractive, the
inability to compel the presence and testimony of witnesses, aide workers, other U.N.
officials, and peacekeepers, or those who might have learned of the abuses through
pictures or other descriptions, is a flaw to any prosecution and turns the prosecution into a
he-said/she-said battle. Add to this the possible inability of young victims to positively
identify their attacker beyond a reasonable doubt, and peacekeeper prosecutions at the
ICC seem doomed to an uncertain, and inequitable, outcome under the procedural
requirements set forth in the ICC statute regardless of their viability under the terms of
the current crimes and elements codified in the ICC statute.
Ultimately, the ICC is not the proper jurisdiction for prosecution of peacekeepers
on abuse charges of any type, and particularly sexual abuses. The ICC statute was created
to codify the tradition of prosecuting those accused of political and military-political
atrocities which started with the prosecutions at Nuremberg and evolved from that
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point.148 It was not created to try individuals for their separate crimes, apart from their
complicity in a larger plan to harm or destroy a population.149 Also, it is the author’s
belief that the ICC was intended to be used as a body for prosecution of internationally
condemned ideas and beliefs, such as those which emerged from the conflicts in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as reflected in the crimes and criminal elements codified in the
ICC statute.150 If this is true, then the prosecution of U.N. peacekeepers at the ICC would
be inappropriate because the ideas and beliefs espoused by the U.N. vis a vis
peacekeeping as a whole are not likely to be viewed as morally or legally reprehensible,
and thus are not within the realm of the intent to try a system, or organization, as well as
the individual members of it.
V. THE USCMJ AS APPLIED TO ALLEGED PEACEKEEPER OFFENSES
In contrast to the above description of the ICC statute and jurisdiction, were any
implicated peacekeepers to be Americans (at present this is not the case), they would be
subject to a well defined and precise trial, both in the elements of the crime itself and the
trial and prosecution.151
Unlike the ICC, U.S. military courts function to prosecute military personnel in
all manner of crimes, from those relating to their commands or actions while on duty152 to
criminal acts involving non-military personnel.153 The system functions to separate
military personnel from standard civilian justice and govern them according to traditional
laws regarding combat situations and situations in which U.S. personnel who are
148
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currently serving in the armed forces find themselves.154 The prosecution of a soldier for
acts amounting to war crimes is not an indictment of the U.S. military, its ideas and goals,
but rather of the individual, or, in some occasions of a chain of command.155
In terms of prosecuting the alleged sexual abuses by peacekeepers, the USCMJ
would allow individual prosecution of soldiers for child abuse,156 cruelty and
maltreatment,157 rape,158 sodomy,159 conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman
(a crime which could be applied to the abandonment of children fathered in the course of
peacekeeping),160 and sexual harassment.161 All of these charges are made against the
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individual,162 and the USCMJ also provides the basis for an accessory after the fact
prosecution should it be alleged that a member of the peacekeeping staff became aware of
the abuse after it was committed and yet did nothing to report it or otherwise stop such
abuses from happening.163 In this way, the USCMJ would allow for fair prosecution of
the individual, and hold the rest of the mission accountable for knowledge of abuses after
the fact, while not in any way indicting (whether in fact or implication) the mission and
idea of the U.S. military as a whole or, by extension, the peacekeeping mission as a
whole if applied in that context.
Turning to the more procedural aspects as the USCMJ, the accused has the
knowledge that the prosecuting officer is a member of the military as well, and does not
have the same all-encompassing powers as an ICC Prosecutor.164 Additionally, the
USCMJ does not require judicial approval of an investigation before it occurs,165 as is the
case with the ICC statutory provisions.166 The accused also is given the right to counsel
who is also a military officer and is versed in the laws of the military itself.167 In terms of
witness production, the USCMJ specifically allows the military courts to legally require
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witnesses to appear before the court and testify,168 under threat of prosecution if they do
not in fact appear.169
The USCMJ and military courts have a long history due to their age and
continued use throughout U.S. history, and a concise history of cases illustrating the
above points is not within the scope of this paper. However, it is important to note such a
history, as it allows prosecution for acts such as the alleged peacekeeper abuses, and thus
provides both the prosecution and the defense in such a situation with guideposts for trial
and appeals, as well as with a standard body of law which can be relied on and which is
not in flux due to the volatile nature of the subject matter and political climate, as could
be the case with the ICC.170
VI. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE PEACEKEEPING APPARATUS
The current abuse allegations against U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo present two
interrelated yet distinct situations which need to be addressed in order to assure that there
is justice for the unwilling victims of abuse and a legitimate and respected body to assist
in peacekeeping activities in the future. Each of these situations will be addressed
separately.
A. SHORT-TERM CHANGES AND SOLUTIONS
The short term goal of the UNSC, particularly the permanent members who gave
rise to the U.N. in the beginning, must be to provide the victims of abuse with counseling
and medical assistance, as well as the promise that there will be justice for them. These
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steps are not only humanitarian gestures, they are indeed necessary to preserve some
semblance of credibility for the peacekeeping concept and the U.N. as a larger entity.
The provision of counseling and medical assistance to victims is a weighty task
given the fear and reluctance of victims, especially children, to come forward, and should
be the task of trained child psychologists and other mental health professionals with
documented experience. The author suspects that the best candidates for this job would
be female doctors, as the trauma of seeing male doctors who remind the victims of their
attackers could be counterproductive to the attempted medical assistance. Counseling and
medical assistance must also be made available to the families of the victims so they can
understand the trauma suffered by their family member, and, where appropriate, receive
medical assistance and treatment themselves. Further, the peacekeepers who fathered
children with local women must be found if possible through such measures as
mandatory DNA tests, and made to take care of their children and the women with whom
they had children. If identification is not possible, lifetime care for these women and
children should be provided by the U.N. itself. The author proposes that the counseling,
medical treatment, and palimony be funded by the nations which contributed abusive
peacekeepers.
It is clear from the evidence that, while the U.N. investigation of the alleged
abuses was being conducted, further abuses were being committed by peacekeepers in the
very areas under investigation.171 Not only does this evince both questionable judgment
and a sense of being above the law on the part of the abusive peacekeepers and members
of the mission administration, it also implicates the faith one can have in reformation of
peacekeeping missions without some additional oversight. Therefore, the permanent
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members of the UNSC, or at least two of these members, should send envoys from their
own military corps to oversee the conduct of the peacekeepers, as well as the creation of
secured missions where the comings and goings of the peacekeepers would be heavily
monitored. Evidence from victims indicates that a frequent method of enticing women
and children to prostitute themselves was with the promise of obtaining payment in food,
which they would use to feed their starving families.172 With this in mind, the
peacekeepers should not be allowed to have access to excess food or other supplies, and
access to facilities where food and other commodities are stored must be under heavy
surveillance at all times.
Legally, the home countries of abusive peacekeepers must actively prosecute the
peacekeepers, and the U.N. must repatriate these peacekeepers to their home countries so
that the prosecutions can start. Although the victims will still be forced to deal with
uneven justice based on the nationality of their abusers, they must still be given the fullest
possible justice allowed under the legal system of their abuser. To that end, it is
imperative that the U.N. release to the public at large the identities of the home countries
of the abusers, and put pressure on these countries to vigorously prosecute the abusive
peacekeepers. Indeed, these countries should be subject to economic sanctions and
removed from eligibility to send any further peacekeepers (as well as forced to recall all
current peacekeepers) should they fail to prosecute the abusers to the fullest extent
allowed under their legal systems. While this might sound excessive, countries which are
heavily dependent on the U.N. and its subsidiary agencies for commercial, infrastructural,
humanitarian, and other aide are not likely to ignore the threat of a sanction, regardless of
their past precedents in prosecuting allegedly abusive peacekeepers.
172

See supra Part III A.

30

To say that these suggestions are anything more than remedial and stop-gap
measures would be clearly erroneous, however in the short-term such measures are a
good option because they validate the rights of the victims and the ideal of the
preservation of peace and the importance of humanitarian actions and policies upon
which the U.N., and later the U.N. peacekeeping missions, was founded.
B. LONG TERM APPARATUS CHANGES
Peacekeeping missions in the abstract are a vital expression of the ideas and goals
of the U.N., and the humanitarianism of its members. The key to the future of
peacekeeping missions is to re-examine the original provisions of the U.N. Charter before
the peacekeeping mandate was inferred into the Chapter VI provisions.173 In so doing, the
theme of a separate military force under the joint command, and ultimate control, of the
UNSC emerges as the intent of the framers of the Charter.174 Certainly it seems unlikely
that a separate U.N. military would come to fruition as the fighting force of its member
states, especially when these member states are frequently those going to war with each
other and/or committing humanitarian atrocities against groups of people.175 However, it
is the author’s position that if the concepts of the Charter were combined with the
inference of a peacekeeping force, there would be a peacekeeping apparatus which would
be effective, structured, and able to punish and prevent abuses like those seen in the
Congo.
By creating a joint command premised on the Joint Chiefs of Staff model used by
the U.S. military, there would be a greater deal of accountability and coordination
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between the mission commands. Under this structure, member states would not volunteer
their soldiers for peacekeeping duty, rather the U.N. military force would actively recruit
both interested civilians and current military personnel from around the globe to join the
force. This would require that the recruits forsake the laws of their home country,
whatever it might be, and agree to be subject to the jurisdiction of the military court for
the force, thus solving the uneven justice problem and preventing the possibility of
legally savvy peacekeepers being more likely to commit abuses knowing that they will
not face severe punishments in their home country’s military court.
In terms of the military law used, as between the laws of the permanent members
of the UNSC the most similar legal systems are those of the U.S. and the U.K., and
accordingly, for stability and ease of adapting these laws to the force, those should be
used as the code for the U.N. military force. This would reconcile the issues with the
current legal status of peacekeepers and the application of the ICC statute to U.N.
peacekeepers with the guaranteed prosecutorial abilities and procedural benefits found in
the USCMJ.176 By adopting laws which have cases establishing precedent, the lawyers
involved in the prosecutions on both sides would have a better knowledge and
understanding of how to argue their cases, and judges would have a far better
understanding of how to apply statutory law.
Along with the U.N. military force there would have to be a recruitment and
screening process for all civilian staff members, and an office specifically for the
oversight of peacekeeper activities and interaction with the local populations must be
created and well staffed. This office should be charged with, among other things,
educating the local community about the proper and improper actions of peacekeepers,
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and how and where they should report any instances of inappropriate conduct by the
peacekeepers. All of these suggestions would rather obviously require funding, which the
author submits should not go directly through the U.N., especially in the wake of the oilfor-food scandal.177 Rather, the permanent UNSC members alone should fund the U.N.
military force with contributions which are commensurate to their contributions as of
2005. As a corollary, the contributions of each of the permanent UNSC members would
then be significantly reduced to accommodate the funding of the peacekeeping operation.
Since one of the primary tasks assigned to the permanent UNSC members is the
maintenance of “international peace and security,” and since this task requires a robust
peacekeeping and military force, the permanent members’ first financial responsibility
should be the creation and maintenance of an organized, legally accountable, and morally
respected U.N. military force.
In terms of the troops themselves, recruits must be carefully screened and vetted
before they are allowed to become peacekeepers. Key among the screening processes
must be the mandatory taking of an HIV/AIDS test before and during deployment. In the
event that any fathering issues should arise, pictures of the peacekeepers must be
maintained on file, and all deployed peacekeepers and accompanying personnel must be
required to give a DNA sample prior to deployment. Should any peacekeeper alter his
appearance while deployed or prior to deployment, he should be required to resubmit a
photograph. These measures do tend to go into some of the private realm which civil
libertarians, especially in America, tend to hold dear, however, in order to rehabilitate the
peacekeeping idea and ensure that it can exist in a functional and helpful way, these steps
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must be taken. The world, and particularly the victims, must be assured that such
allegations of abuse by peacekeepers do not occur again.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the concept of a U.N. peacekeeping force evolved from a somewhat
questionable interpretation of the U.N. Charter to both win the Nobel Peace Prize and to
become known for truly abominable sexual abuses of those it was charged with
protecting. This dichotomy has been in no way helped by the uneven legal fates which
await abusive peacekeepers when they return to their home countries. The idea of using
the ICC to prosecute these errant peacekeepers does not provide the victims with a real
chance at having substantive charges brought against the peacekeeper who abused her,
and does not provide either the prosecution or the defense adequate procedural and
fairness safeguards before and during the trial. In contrast with these substantive and
procedural issues with using the ICC statute stands the USCMJ, a well-established legal
system which would allow for prosecution of peacekeepers as individuals and which
contains crimes which fit those allegedly committed by the peacekeepers, while
guaranteeing procedural adequacy and fairness to the prosecution and the defense in a
less politically charged atmosphere than the ICC. The USCMJ does not investigate or
prosecute the ideas of the institution which created and deployed the peacekeepers, rather
it investigates and prosecutes those peacekeepers who have violated the law. In so doing,
the individual is brought to justice, while the institution itself can point to the prosecution
of an errant member as evidence that it too condemns the act and that the act is not a part
of the value set and goals advanced by the institution. This protects the contributions of
those members of the institution who truly believe in its goals and have fought and
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sacrificed for the institution, at the same time that it protects future local populations
from facing the prospect of allowing in potential predators or not electing to allow in
peacekeepers who might otherwise save their society.
The suggestions made in this paper aim to reconcile the two elements present in
international peacekeeping missions, especially where there are problems within the
mission: humanitarianism and law. One can have humanitarianism and no law and
generate a system much like the current U.N. peacekeeping system, which is besmirched
by the horrid allegations of abuse made against peacekeepers, and leaves a legacy of
uneven justice for victims. One can have law and no humanitarianism and end up with a
dusty book of statutes sitting in a library, an ancient relic never used because there was
never sufficient societal interest in the concept to create a peacekeeping force to govern.
Or, one can combine the two and have a system that benefits humanity not only through
its acts but also through its assurances of even and fair justice. That is the combination
which will allow the idea of international peacekeeping to flourish.
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